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Does desire for an outcome inflate optimism? Previous experiments have produced mixed results 
regarding the desirability bias, with the bulk of supportive findings coming from one paradigm—the 
classic marked-card paradigm in which people make discrete predictions about desirable or 
undesirable cards being drawn from decks. We introduce a biased-guessing account for the effects 
from this paradigm, which posits that people are often realistic in their likelihood assessments, but 
when making a subjectively arbitrary prediction (a guess), they will tend to guess in a desired 
direction. In order to establish the validity of the biased-guessing account and to distinguish it from 
other accounts, we conducted five experiments that tested the desirability bias within the paradigm and 
novel extensions of it. In addition to supporting the biased-guessing account, the findings illustrate the 
critical role of moderators (e.g., type of outcome, type of forecast) for fully understanding and predicting 
desirability biases. 
. 
Introduction 
Julie, who works at the west branch of a company, gets a 
stunner from her morning newspaper: The corporate office is 
closing either the east or west branch, to be announced later. 
Julie scours the rest of the story looking for clues about which 
branch will close. 
While vacationing in Seattle, Bob is tickled to hear that if the 
weather conditions are right, the Blue Angels Squadron will per- 
form a flight demonstration near his hotel. He promptly checks 
several weather forecasts. 
Does the fact that Julie wants to keep her job and Bob wants to 
see the flight demonstration cause them to be biased in an 
optimistic direction, with Julie expecting that her branch will be 
safe and Bob expecting the weather to cooperate? In more 
general terms, the question being raised is whether people tend 
to show a desirability bias—an effect in which the desire for an 
outcome inflates optimism about that outcome. 
Research on the desirability bias (also known as the wishful 
thinking effect) has not produced a consistent set of findings. Per- 
haps the most widely known studies that have directly tested 
the desirability bias used a paradigm developed by Marks (1951) 
in which people are asked to make dichotomous predictions about 
whether a marked card will be drawn from a deck (e.g., Crandall, 
Solomon, & Kellaway, 1955; Irwin 1953; Irwin & Metzger, 1966). 
These studies tend to produce robust desirability biases—that is, 
participants predict a marked card more often when the drawing 
of a marked card would result in a monetary gain. However, out- 
side this marked-card paradigm, detection of a consistent 
desirability bias seems to be more elusive (see Bar-Hillel & 
Budescu, 1995; Bar-Hillel, Budescu, & Amar, 2008a, 2008b; for 
review see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007a). To date, relatively 
little is known about the underlying causal  mechanisms that 
yield desirability biases in the marked-card paradigm, and why 
these mechanisms have not produced consistent effects outside 
the paradigm. 
Therefore, the overall goal of the present research was to 
identify the key mechanisms accounting for the desirability 
biases in the marked-card paradigm, and to investigate the 
applicability of these mechanisms when key aspects of the 
paradigm are altered. Addressing these issues is critical for 
achieving a better under- standing of how desires impact 
people’s expectations. In the next sections, we first briefly 
summarize findings from a recent meta- analysis on desirability 
effects, before then discussing possible mechanisms that will be 
tested in our experiments. 
Evidence regarding the desirability bias 
Krizan and Windschitl (2007a) recently conducted meta-
analysis of studies in which the desirability of outcomes was 
experimentally manipulated and in which the dependent 
variable was some 
form of a forecast. The analysis was also restricted to cases in 
which respondents did not have an ability to control the outcome; 
as illustrated in the opening vignettes, such cases are common and 
important in everyday life. Each study in the analysis was classified 
into one of four categories, defined by whether the study 
concerned outcomes that were purely stochastic in nature (e.g., 
card-draw outcomes) or had some nonstochastic determinants 
(e.g., competition outcomes), and whether participants were asked 
to provide a discrete outcome prediction or some form of a 
likelihood or confidence judgment about an outcome. For each of 
these four categories, Fig. 1 displays the number of studies that 
were located for the review and the relevant meta-analyzed effect 
sizes for the desirability bias. The figure reveals some critical 
complexities. One cell is entirely empty because no studies in that 
category were located despite a concerted search. More 
importantly, studies in the stochastic-predictions cell (upper left) 
appear to produce large desirability effects, whereas the overall 
effect in the stochastic- likelihood cell is essentially nil, and the 
overall effect in the nonstochastic-likelihood cell is small yet 
significant. In short, one cell stands out—studies in the 
stochastic-predictions cell have produced desirability biases at 
a level and consistency that is not matched by other cells. 
Naturally, there is good reason peer deeper into the studies and 
effects within that cell. 
Of the 14 studies in that cell, 12 involved the classic marked- 
card paradigm or a close variant (e.g., Crandall et al., 1955; Irwin 
1953; Marks, 1951). In the prototypical study, participants are first 
told the proportion of cards that are marked (which might be 
manipulated from 10% to 90%) and then are told whether drawing 
a marked card will mean that they gain or lose some specified 
amount of money (or points). Participants make predictions about 
numerous decks before learning anything about the outcomes of 
the card draws. Of the 12 studies using this marked-card paradigm 
and soliciting dichotomous outcome predictions, all 12 produced 
significant desirability biases (see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007a). 
That is, participants predicted a marked card more often when a 
marked card would result in a gain rather than a loss. The bias 
tended to be largest for decks that contained 50% marked cards. 
Monetary and instructional incentives to be accurate in one’s pre- 
dictions did not tend to reduce the size of the desirability bias in 
this paradigm. Because findings from the marked-card paradigm 
have tended to be robust and replicable, they have become the 
hallmark example of scientific evidence that people are prone to 
suffer from a desirability bias in their forecasts. 
Possible mechanisms 
Although numerous studies have produced a desirability bias in 
the marked-card paradigm, explanations as to how such a bias 
operates or why it might be greater in some paradigms than in 
others has tended to be discussed in only a cursory fashion 
(notable exceptions include Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; Price & 
Marquez, 2005). In this paper, we explicitly consider four types 
of accounts for the desirability bias in the marked-card paradigm. 
The first account refers to an artifactual explanation that has 
not been adequately tested. In previous studies using the marked-
card paradigm, participants were told by the experimenter what 
the value of drawing a marked card would be. The same 
experimenter would also orally solicit a prediction about whether 
the drawn card would be marked. This procedure is clearly 
vulnerable to experimenter bias and demand characteristics (e.g., 
Rosen-thal & Fode, 1963). It is easy to imagine that the way in 
which an experimenter asks the ‘‘Will it be a marked card?” 
question could be different if drawing a marked card would have 
good rather than bad consequences for the participant, and it is 
easy to imagine that the respondent might feel some pressure to 
respond in a certain way when the experimenter is directly 
posing the questions. 
The second type of account, which we will call the biased-
evaluation account, posits that desire for an outcome biases the 
way in which the evidence for that outcome is perceived or 
evaluated. In the broader literature on motivated reasoning, 
there are several empirical demonstrations that suggest that 
evidence for a desired conclusion is viewed as stronger or with 
less skepticism than would the same evidence for an undesired 
conclusion (for reviews see Balcetis, 2008; Kunda, 1990; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Trope & Liberman, 1996; see also 
Krizan & Windschitl, 2007a). As applied to the marked-card 
paradigm, the biased-evaluation ac- count (or any variant 
thereof) would suggest that the stated pro- portion of marked 
cards somehow seems larger  or  more favorable when marked 
cards are desirable rather than undesirable. Although some 
readers might question  whether  a  precise and fully relevant 
statement about the proportion of marked cards (e.g., ‘‘4 of the 10 
cards are marked”) could be differentially evaluated, we note that 
there have been numerous studies showing that even the most 
precise numeric information can be viewed as big- ger or smaller 
as a function of context or presentational features (see e.g., Hsee, 
1996; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992; Klein, 1997; Pe-ters et al., 
2006; Windschitl, Martin, & Flugstad; 2002; Windschitl 
& Weber, 1999). Therefore, it is theoretically tenable that desire for 
a marked card could make ‘‘4 out of 10” seem larger than it other- 
wise  would. 
The third type of account, which we will call the biased-thresh- 
old account, assumes that the evaluation of the evidence for a 
marked card is unbiased, but the decision threshold for predicting 
that a marked card will be drawn is lower when the marked cards 
are desired rather than undesired. Therefore, when the subjective 
probability of a marked card is 40%, this might trigger a prediction 
Fig. 1. A summarized representation of the experimental studies on the desirability bias that met the inclusion criteria for Krizan & Windschitl (2007a) review and meta- 
analysis. Note: 
* 
Indicates that the 95% confidence interval around the population estimate of the standardized mean difference or odds-ratio excluded 0 or 1, respectively. 
 
 
of a marked card when the card is desirable, but not when it is 
undesirable. Price and Marquez (2005) described this  account 
and its relation to a signal detection framework. The account is also 
related to the ‘‘Can I/Must I” distinction, which assumes that 
people require lower evidence standards for drawing palatable 
conclusions rather than unpalatable conclusions (see Dawson, 
Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; Gilovich, 1991). 
Although the artifactual account, the biased-evaluation account, 
and the biased-threshold account are all tenable, we are—in this 
paper—introducing a fourth account. We call it the biased-guessing 
account. The account posits that the desirability bias found in a 
typical marked-card study comes from an asymmetric approach 
to guessing an outcome—i.e., guessing more often in an 
optimistic rather than pessimistic direction. By the term guess, 
we refer to the act of making a prediction that is, in a substantial 
way, subjectively arbitrary. For example, when a respondent in 
the marked- card paradigm encounters a deck with five marked 
and five un- marked cards, he or she is essentially forced to 
guess. Even when there is an imbalanced deck—say four marked 
and six unmarked cards—a respondent might still make a guess 
when generating a prediction, because the outcome seems 
unknowable from his or her position. The respondent can guess 
or predict the marked card if he or she sees no contradiction 
between knowing that there are fewer marked than unmarked 
cards and anticipating a marked card. After all, a marked card 
is possible and will indeed occur 40% of the time.1 
In sum, we have described four accounts of desirability bias in 
the marked-card paradigm, the first of which refers to a potential 
artifact. The biased-evaluation account refers to a bias in the way 
evidence is assessed or evaluated, whereas the biased-threshold 
and biased-guessing accounts do not. Rather, the latter two can 
be applied to the decision–prediction processes. The main 
distinction between the biased-threshold and biased-guessing 
account is that the biased-guessing account assumes that the 
key process responsible for the bulk of the desirability bias in 
outcome predictions is guessing. That is, when people believe 
that part of their prediction is arbitrary (a guess), they will tend 
to guess optimistically. When there is no subjectively arbitrary 
element to their pre- diction, the biased-guessing account does not 
predict a desirability bias, but the biased-threshold account 
would still predict a bias due to a lowered threshold for 
desirable outcomes. 
 
The present experiments 
 
We believe that the biased-guessing account describes most of 
what drives the desirability biases that have been detected within 
the marked-card paradigm. Testing this notion was a key goal for 
the present research. An interrelated goal was to test the 
predictions of the biased-guessing account versus other 
accounts for desirability biases outside the typical marked-
card paradigm— namely in cases when the target events are 
nonstochastic rather than stochastic (corresponding to the 
nonstochastic-predictions cell in Fig. 1) or in cases when people 
are asked to provide likelihood judgments rather than discrete 
outcome predictions (corresponding to the stochastic-likelihood 
cell). Investigating both of these cases is critical for achieving a 
more complete understanding of the desirability bias. 
The first step in our empirical work was to test for a desirability 
bias in an improved version of the classic marked-card paradigm, 
one that allowed us to rule out artifactual accounts of the classic 
 
 
1 
While researchers might readily identify this as a nonoptimal strategy, studies on 
probability matching show that some people will occasionally predict the less likely 
of two outcomes rather than use a maximization strategy for their predictions, in 
which they would always predict the more likely outcome (e.g., Gal & Baron, 1996; 
Peterson & Ulehla, 1965). 
effects described earlier. Having produced a reliable effect in this 
paradigm (Experiment 1), we then used it as a general platform 
that we systematically modified for the remaining experiments. 
In Experiments 2 and 3, we retained many critical features of the 
paradigm, but we introduced modifications that allowed us to test 
for a desirability bias when the target outcomes were nonstochas- 
tic rather than purely stochastic. As we will discuss in more detail 
later, guessing is typically less relevant to nonstochastic outcomes 
than to stochastic ones, so the biased-threshold and biased-
guessing accounts differ in their predictions for these two types 
of out- comes. Then in Experiment 4, we again slightly 
modified the paradigm from Experiment 1 in order to test for a 
desirability bias when likelihood judgments rather than 
dichotomous predictions were solicited. Whereas guessing and 
decision thresholds can play a role in trying to anticipate the 
specific outcome of an event, they do not play the same role in how 
people typically estimate the likelihood of an outcome. Therefore, 
the biased-guessing and biased- threshold accounts make 
different predictions from the biased- evaluation accounts for 
the results of Experiment 4. Finally, in the most direct test of 
the guessing account (Experiment 5), we used a novel scale-
juxtaposition method and special instructions to test whether 
people would exhibit a desirability bias when specifically 
encouraged to express their guesses on a likelihood scale. 
 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Our main goal for Experiment 1 was to test for a desirability 
bias in a new and improved version of the classic marked-card 
paradigm—one that would preclude artifactual explanations that 
are potentially applicable to the effects previously found in the 
classic paradigm. Like the classic marked-card studies, we 
presented people with a series of decks, we manipulated the 
desirability of specific cards (through monetary means), we 
manipulated the stated frequencies of these cards, and we had 
participants make dichotomous outcome predictions. Also, 
although manipulations of accuracy incentives have not had 
systematic effects on predictions in marked-card studies (see 
Krizan & Windschitl, 2007a), we wanted to provide some 
external incentive for accuracy, so participants were told that 
they would receive a monetary bonus for each accurate prediction. 
The most critical change from the classic paradigm was that we 
made our experimenters blind to the value of drawing a marked 
card. As mentioned earlier, the experimenters in previous studies 
were not only aware of the value of a marked card, but they were 
also responsible for soliciting predictions from participants, which 
opened a clear potential for demand characteristics. In our 
Experiment 1, we used a computer for specifying the value of 
drawing a marked card  and recording  the  participant’s  
prediction—with both the value specification and prediction 
unknown to the experimenter. 
The second notable change in our paradigm concerned the 
markings on the cards. In the classic paradigm, each card in each 
deck is either marked (with the same marking, such as an X) or un- 
marked. This fact might pressure participants to avoid providing 
the same response in runs of three or more, which could thereby 
increase the number of nonoptimal predictions and inflate the ob- 
served biases. In our paradigm, each card in a deck contained one 
of two markings, and the markings for one deck were entirely 
different from the markings for other decks. For example, in one 
deck, each card was either marked with blue or orange, whereas 
in an- other deck, each card was either marked with a triangle or a 
square. Therefore, rather than being asked whether a marked card 
will or will not be drawn, the participants were asked whether the 
drawn card will be one marked with blue or orange, for example. 
From our perspective as researchers, some cards in a deck were 
designated as critical (i.e., contained the mark we designated as 
critical) and the others were noncritical. 
With these two  changes, Experiment  1 constituted the most 
stringent test of the desirability bias in a marked-card paradigm 
to date. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Fifteen undergraduate students participated in Experiment 1. 
Participants in the experiments in this paper received credit to- 
ward a research exposure component of their Elementary 
Psychology Course. The main design was a 3 (value of the critical 
card: +$1, 0, -$1) x 5 (frequency of critical card: 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 
out of 10) within-subject design. There was also one 
counterbalancing factor, described later. Each participant 
actually provided 2 data points per cell of this 3 x 5 design, but 
we collapse all results across this replication factor. 
Procedures 
The experimenter and participant were seated at opposite sides 
of a table on which sat a computer screen that faced only the 
participant. There were 30 decks of cards on a table behind the 
experimenter. The participant was informed that he or she would 
start with $3 and that this amount would change depending on 
the out- comes of card draws in 30 rounds and the accuracy of 
his or her predictions about those draws. Detailed instructions 
about how the 30 rounds would proceed included the following 
information: 
(1) each deck contained exactly 10 cards, (2) there were two 
possible markings for cards within a deck, (3) the drawing of a 
given mark could be worth +$1, $0, or -$1 as specified, (4) for each 
accurate prediction, the participant would receive $0.25, (5) the 
experimenter would be the person who drew from the deck, and 
(6) no outcomes would be revealed until the end of the 30 
rounds. After these instructions, there were two practice rounds 
without feed- back, followed by the 30 real rounds, which were 
randomized separately for each participant. 
Each round proceeded as follows. A recorded voice announced 
the round/deck number. On the screen, the participant viewed 
value information about the two types of markings for the 
current deck. For example, some participants read that if a card 
marked with Z was drawn, they would gain $1, but if a card 
marked with Y was drawn, they would get $0. (Critical marks 
always had values of +$1, $0, or -$1; noncritical marks always 
had a value of $0.) After a short delay, the computer prompted 
the experimenter to announce the frequencies of the two types of 
marks and also pro- vide the participant with a sheet of paper 
stating this information. Returning to our example, the 
participant would hear and read that four cards were marked 
with Z and six cards with Y. Finally, the dependent measure 
would appear on screen: ‘‘What is your prediction about which 
card will be drawn?” After the participant responded (by 
clicking one of two buttons), the experimenter shuffled the 
deck, selected an arbitrary card, placed the card face down on the 
top of the deck, and returned the deck to the back table. At this 
point, the next round would begin. 
At the end of the 30 rounds, participants completed individual- 
difference measures. (Details about the individual-difference 
measures and relevant findings are reported in Appendix A for this 
and all the remaining experiments.) Then the outcomes for the 30 
rounds were revealed, and participants were paid, debriefed, and 
dismissed. 
or 7 cards with a critical mark (on the face side), and the remaining 
cards had a noncritical mark. For each participant, the critical 
marks for some decks were imbued with a +1 value, others with 
a $0 value, and others with a -$1 value. The noncritical marks al- 
ways had a value of $0. The full crossing of the frequency factor and 
the value factor required 15 decks, but we also added an internal 
replication, so 30 decks were used. A between-subject 
counterbalancing ensured that for a given deck, the critical card 
was imbued with each of the possible values equally often across 
participants. Also, the left–right order of on-screen information 
and response options regarding the critical and noncritical 
markings was equally balanced across the 30 rounds and within 
any value condition. Finally, the critical and noncritical markings 
were always unique to a particular deck; we used various pairs of 
colors, letters, and shapes for the markings. 
Results 
Fig. 2 shows the percentage of times that respondents predicted 
the critical mark as a function of its frequency and value (see 
Appendix B for the exact means and standard deviations relevant 
to Fig. 2). The pattern in Fig. 2 is fully consistent with patterns from 
previous marked-card studies. Of course, the most important 
element of this pattern is how the desirability of a critical mark 
influenced participants’ tendencies to predict it. Overall, when a 
critical mark was desirable (i.e., it would yield +$1 whereas the 
noncritical mark would yield $0), participants predicted the 
critical mark 68.7% of the time. When a critical mark was 
neutral (i.e., both it and the noncritical mark would yield $0), 
participants predicted it 50.0% of the time. When a critical mark 
was undesirable (i.e., it would yield -$1 whereas the noncritical 
mark would yield $0), participants predicted it only 38.0% of the 
time. 
For inferential tests, we scored the prediction of a critical and 
noncritical card as a 1 and 0, respectively. These scores were then 
averaged, within subjects and cells, to create composite scores, 
which were then submitted to ANOVAs and t-tests. A repeated 
measures ANOVA on these composites revealed a significant 
desirability or value effect, F(2, 13) = 9.69, p < .01. t-Tests also 
revealed that the rate of selecting the critical card was greater 
in the +$1 condition than in the $0 condition, t(14) = 4.52, p < .001, 
and greater in the $0 condition than in the -$1 condition, 
t(14) = 2.74, p < .05. 
The  ANOVA  also  revealed  a  significant  effect  of  frequency, 
F(4, 11) = 57.51,  p < .001.  That  is,  people  were  sensitive—albeit 
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normatively undersensitive—to the frequency of the marked card 
(see sloping lines in Fig. 2). 
The Desirability x Frequency interaction was also significant, 
F(8, 7) = 14.54, p < .01. In Fig. 2, the desirability bias appears to be 
larger when the frequency of critical marks is 5 rather than 3, 4, 
6, or 7. For each participant, we calculated a composite of the 
desirability bias within each frequency condition by subtracting 
the rate of selecting the marked card in the -$1 condition from 
the same rate in the +$1 condition. A series of paired t-tests 
confirm that the magnitude of the desirability bias was indeed 
larger in the five-card condition than in any other condition (all 
p < .05). 
Finally, we should also note that the main effects in Fig. 2 were 
not driven only by a small subset of participants. In fact, of the 15 
participants, 12 exhibited results that were directionally consistent 
with the desirability bias (i.e., they predicted more critical cards in 
the +$1 condition than the -$1 condition), and the remaining three 
exhibited neutral results. All 15 participants exhibited results 
consistent with a sensitivity to frequency information. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 detected a robust desirability effect in a new and 
improved paradigm. Because the experimenter was unaware of the 
value of a marked card in a given deck and because participants’ 
responses were not immediately visible to the experimenter, this 
paradigm rules out the possibility that experimenter bias accounts 
for previous results and it minimizes the potential role of demand 
characteristics. The paradigm also removed some pressure on 
participants to avoid providing the same response on consecutive 
decks—a pressure that might have augmented non-normative 
responding. Finally, because it provided a successful 
demonstration of the desirability bias, Experiment 1 and its 
paradigm can serve as a platform for examining whether the 
desirability bias ob- served in the marked-card paradigm extends 
beyond its usual con- fines. This is important for reasons of 
external validity, but it is also important for determining which of 
the other three accounts we mentioned earlier best explains the 
observed bias. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested whether the desirability bias would 
extend to events that were nonstochastic rather than purely sto- 
chastic. Such events are common in everyday life, yet the Krizan 
and Windschitl (2007a) review found no experiments that tested 
for wishful thinking in outcome predictions regarding such events 
(the now empty cell of Fig. 1). The experiment was a mixed design, 
with some participants in a card (stochastic) condition and some in 
a trivia (nonstochastic) condition. The card condition was identical 
to Experiment 1. The trivia condition was constructed to be as sim- 
ilar as possible to the card condition, except for the nonstochastic 
nature of the questions that participants encountered. For this tri- 
via condition, we constructed a list of 30 trivia questions that each 
had two possible responses. For example, ‘‘What animal makes a 
louder noise?—blue whale or lion.” Participants were asked to pre- 
dict the factually correct option, and they were promised $0.25 for 
every accurate prediction.2 Recall that for the card paradigm, we 
arbitrarily deemed one of the two markings from a deck as the crit- 
ical one, and if that card happened to be the drawn card, the partic- 
ipant would receive +1, $0, or -$1 (regardless of their prediction). 
Similarly, for the trivia condition, we arbitrarily deemed one of the 
two options from a trivia question as the critical one, and if that op- 
2 
We use the term prediction to refer to participants’ task of indicating the factually 
correct answer, even though the event on which the answer is based is already 
determined. The question of whether it is important that these ‘‘predictions” are 
really postdictions is addressed later in the paper. 
tion happened to be the factual option, the participant would receive 
+1, $0, or -$1 (regardless of their prediction). For example, some 
participants were told that if the blue whale was louder (i.e., if it 
was the factual option), they would win $1, but if the lion was 
louder, they would get $0. Hence, these participants would desire 
that blue whale was the factual option because this would yield a 
dollar (irrespective of their prediction). Of course, they would be 
wise to ignore this desire when formulating their prediction; in 
order to maximize their chances of gaining the $0.25 accuracy 
reward, they should base their prediction—as best they can—on 
their relevant knowledge of blue whales and lions. In short, the card 
and trivia conditions had important parallels and both tested 
whether people would tend to predict the more desirable of the 
two outcomes. 
Not only does the trivia condition in Experiment 2 explore the 
generalizability of the findings from  the  marked-card  paradigm, 
but it also helps distinguish among the biased-evaluation, biased- 
threshold, and biased-guessing accounts. If biased evidence 
evaluation was the key mediator of the effect in the card 
paradigm, we should see similarly robust effects in the trivia 
paradigm of Experiment 2. In fact, the evidence that a person 
might consider seems much more malleable in the trivia paradigm 
than in the card paradigm, so one might even expect a larger 
desirability bias in the trivia paradigm if biased evidence evaluation 
is a key driver of the desirability effect in the marked-card paradigm. 
Similarly, if biased decision thresholds were key in producing the 
effects in the card paradigm, the same robust effects should be 
observed in the trivia paradigm. That is, if biased predictions 
occurred because less evidence (or lower evidential support) was 
required to trigger predictions of desired out- comes than undesired 
outcomes, then this same differential-thresh- old process has full 
potential to occur in the trivia paradigm. 
However, if guessing was a key process in producing the effect 
in the card paradigm, we would expect substantially smaller ef- 
fects in the trivia paradigm. Recall that, by the term guessing, we 
are referring to the act of making a prediction that is, in a 
substantial way, subjectively arbitrary. In the card paradigm, 
this would clearly occur for decks in which  the  proportions  of  
the  critical and noncritical marks are exactly equal. It could also 
occur when they are unequal; a respondent can still guess or 
predict that a minority mark will be drawn if he or she sees no 
clear contradiction between such a guess and knowing that 
there are fewer of those marks than the other marks. In short, 
some people might feel quite comfortable with the following logic: 
‘‘I know there are only four cards with X, but I think it will be X 
on this draw.” Now con- sider guessing in the trivia paradigm. If a 
person evaluates the evidence for the two possible outcomes (e.g., 
his or her relevant knowledge of lion and blue whale) and sees 
absolutely no imbalance in the evidence, he or she would guess 
and might then be vulnerable to a desirability bias (i.e., guessing 
blue whale because it is more desired as a factually true outcome). 
However, if there is any imbalance—if the person’s knowledge 
leans slightly in one direction—the person would be compelled to 
make the guess or prediction that goes in the same direction as 
their knowledge. If not, this would present an internal 
inconsistency in reasoning—e.g., ‘‘My knowledge points to lion, 
but I’m going to say blue whale.” Thus, we suggest that a 
tendency to keep one’s predictions consistent in direction with 
one’s knowledge will preclude a desirability bias whenever one’s 
knowledge supports one trivia outcome more than another. 
For the trivia questions used in Experiment 2, we selected 
questions that people would be unlikely to have previously 
learned the correct answer but would have at least cursory 
background knowledge that they could use as a foundation for 
making a prediction. We presumed that people’s knowledge for 
the two possible out- comes of a question would rarely support 
both in a perfectly equal fashion, so we expected the desirability 
bias to be generally small in the trivia condition. 
In summary, the biased-evaluation and biased-threshold ac- 
counts predict that any desirability bias in the card condition 
should readily extend to the trivia condition. However, our 
biased-guessing account predicts that although there should be a 
replication of the desirability bias in the card condition, it should 
not extend with much robustness to the trivia condition. 
Method 
Participants and design 
Our plan was to randomly assign our participants to either the 
card or trivia condition, which we did for the first 30 participants. 
After analyzing these data and discovering a healthy desirability 
bias in the card condition but null effects in the trivia condition, 
we decided it was important to rule out a Type II error in the trivia 
condition by substantially increasing the sample size. Hence, there 
were a total of 15 participants in the card condition and 39 in the 
trivia condition. 
The card condition involved the same counterbalancing and 
within-subjects factors as Experiment 1. The trivia condition 
included the value factor (+$1, 0, -$1) and a counterbalancing 
factor (described below). Although there was no frequency factor 
for the trivia condition, we did construct the question set such 
that the critical options would range from somewhat weak 
(analogous to a case in which there were few critical marks in a 
deck) to some- what strong. 
Procedures 
The procedures in the card condition were identical to those 
used in Experiment 1. In the trivia condition, the procedures were 
designed to be as similar or parallel as possible. The participant 
was informed that he or she would start with $3 and that this 
amount would change depending on the dollar values associated 
with factual answers to 30 trivia questions and on his or her pre- 
diction accuracy. Detailed instructions about how the 30 rounds 
would proceed included the following information: (1) for each 
question, the participant would see two options and be asked to 
predict which was the factual option, (2) the computer would 
randomly assign a +$1, $0, or -$1 dollar value to each option, (3) 
for the factual option, the participant would win or lose the 
assigned amount regardless of his or her prediction, (4) for 
each accurate prediction, the participant would receive $0.25, 
and (5) no out- comes would be revealed until the end of the 
30 rounds. After these instructions, there were two practice 
rounds without feed- back, followed by 30 real rounds, 
randomized separately for each participant. 
During each round, the participant viewed, on screen, value 
information about the two options for the trivia question—even be- 
fore the question was revealed. For example, participants were told 
that if blue whale was the factual option, they would win $1, but if 
lion was the factual option, they get $0, regardless of how they 
responded. We had arbitrarily and surreptitiously deemed one 
option as the critical one, which was assigned a value of +$1, $0, 
or 
-$1; noncritical options always had a value of $0. After a short de- 
lay, the experimenter provided the participant with a sheet of pa- 
per stating the question (e.g., ‘‘What animal makes a louder 
noise?”). Finally, the dependent measure (‘‘What is your prediction 
about the true answer?”) would appear on screen with the relevant 
response buttons below it. 
At the end of the 30 rounds in both the card and trivia 
conditions, participants completed individual-difference measures 
(see Appendix A). Participants in the trivia condition also read 
each tri- via question again and provided subjective probability 
estimates for both items (critical and noncritical) of a given 
question (adding to 100%). The questionnaire that solicited these 
subjective probability estimates did not list the outcome values 
(+$1, $0, -$1). Then 
participants received accuracy feedback, were paid, debriefed, and 
dismissed. 
Trivia questions, outcome values, and counterbalancing 
Five example trivia questions can be found in Appendix C. The 
critical options for the 30 questions were always assigned a value 
of +$1, $0, or -$1 (for half the questions, the option that was 
deemed to be critical was also the factually correct option). 
Counterbalancing ensured that for a given question, the critical 
option was imbued with each of the possible values equally often 
across participants. Also, the left–right order of on-screen 
information and response options regarding the critical and 
noncritical options was equally balanced across the 30 rounds 
and within any value condition. 
Results 
For the card condition, the results are remarkably similar to 
those of Experiment 1—see Fig. 3 or see Appendix B for exact 
means. Overall, the rate at which the critical mark was predicted 
was 66.7% in the +$1 condition, 54.0% in the $0 condition, and 
40.7% in the -$1 condition. For inferential tests, we used the same 
coding and analyses as described for Experiment 1. A repeated 
measures ANOVA on the composite scores revealed a significant 
desirability effect, F(2, 13) = 7.66, p < .01. t-Tests also revealed that 
the rate of predicting the critical card was greater in the +$1 
condition than in the $0 condition, t(14) = 2.74, p < .05, and 
greater in the $0 condition than in the -$1 condition, 
t(14) = 1.96, p = .07. As in Experiment 1, there was also a robust 
frequency effect, F(4, 11) = 93.38, p < .001. Finally, the 
overall Desirability x Frequency interaction was not 
significant, F(8, 7) = 1.53, p > .20. However, in a set of paired t-
tests that more directly examined the desirability bias across 
frequencies, the desirability bias was larger when there were five 
critical cards in a deck than when there were 3 or 7 critical cards 
(both ps < .05; with the remaining tests nonsignificant). 
Did the robust desirability bias that was detected for the card 
condition also extend to the trivia condition? As expected, the 
answer was no. Overall, the rate at which the critical option was 
predicted was 57.9%, 54.0% and 52.3% in the +$1, $0, and -$1 
conditions, respectively. A repeated measures ANOVA on the 
composites scores for these conditions revealed that 
desirability did not have a significant effect on predictions, 
F(2, 37) = 1.17, p > .20. An overall ANOVA produced a 
significant Desirability (+$1 or -$1) x Event Type 
interaction, which confirmed that the desirability bias 
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Fig. 3. From the card condition of Experiment 2, the percent of trials on which the 
critical card was predicted as a function of the frequency of the critical card (out of 
10) and whether the drawing of a critical card was desirable (+$1), neutral ($0), or 
undesirable  (-$1). 
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was  larger  in  the  card  condition  than  in  the  trivia  condition, 
F(1, 52) = 7.36, p < .01. 
Although we did not systematically manipulate the strength of 
the critical trivia options, they did vary from somewhat weak to 
somewhat strong. We therefore organized the data on this basis 
and produced a graph of the trivia results that is analogous to 
the graph of the results from the card condition (see Fig. 4). To 
create Fig. 4, we first ordered the 30 trivia questions according to 
the strength of the critical items (based on the sample’s mean 
probability estimates for these critical items—collected at the 
end of the experimental session). Then we split the questions 
into five groups and plotted the prediction rates as a function of 
value condition. As seen from Fig. 4, evidence for a desirability 
bias is minimal, at best, regardless of whether the critical 
options were generally weak (far left), moderate (middle), or 
strong (far right). 
Finally, to check whether the subjective probability estimates 
that were collected at the very end of the session were affected by 
the earlier manipulations of desirability, we conducted a repeated 
measures ANOVA on the estimates for the critical items. There 
was no evidence of a desirability bias on the subjective probability 
estimates, F(2, 36) = 1.01, p > .20. The average estimate was 51.8%, 
49.6%, and 51.8% in the +$1, $0, and -$1, conditions, respectively. 
Discussion 
Although there was a robust replication of the desirability bias 
in the card condition, this did not extend to the trivia condition. For 
the sake of comparison, the difference in rate of predicting the 
critical mark/option when in the +$1 condition versus the -$1 
condition, which is one metric of the desirability bias, was 
30.7% in Experiment 1, 26.0% in the card condition of 
Experiment 2, and only 5.6% in the trivia condition of 
Experiment 2. This pattern is consistent with our proposal 
that the desirability bias in the marked-card paradigm is 
primarily driven by biased guessing, 
rather  than  by  biased  evidence  evaluation  or  biased  decision 
uncertainty) are always invulnerable to a desirability bias. We 
believe that if a person considers the evidence for the two 
possible outcomes and sees absolutely no imbalance in the 
evidence, his or her guess for a prediction is open to a desirability 
bias. For the questions we created in Experiment 2, we assumed 
that most participants would typically have some background 
knowledge that would at least point them in a tentative prediction 
direction, there- by precluding a role for biased guessing. However, 
in Experiment 3, we reran a trivia condition and included a subset 
of questions that were specifically designed to leave participants 
with the sense that the two options were equally plausible. These 
questions, which can be colloquially described as ridiculously 
difficult, are precisely the type of questions that we believe are 
vulnerable to biased guessing. 
Method 
Thirty undergraduates participated. The design and procedures 
were identical to those used in the trivia condition of Experiment 
2. The only change was that we replaced 12 of the 30 questions
with new questions that were designed to have options that 
participants would view as essentially indistinguishable. For 
example, one question was: Who invented the lava lamp?—
Andrew Jenkins or Edward Walker. Another was: The first police 
force was established in Paris in what year?—1676 or 1667. 
Additional examples can be found in Appendix C. 
Results 
Consistent with our main prediction, there was a robust 
desirability bias detected for the new questions—as revealed by 
an ANOVA on the composite scores for the +$1, $0, or -$1 
conditions, F(2, 28) = 6.18, p < .01. Among these new questions, the 
overall rate at which the critical mark was predicted was 48.3%, 
42.5%, and 
3 
thresholds. Had biased evaluations or thresholds driven the results 30.8 % in the +$1, $0, and -$1 conditions, respectively. The old 
in the card paradigm used in Experiments 1 and 2, we would have 
seen at least similar levels of bias in the trivia conditions. 
Experiment 3 
The biased-guessing account does not assume that predictions 
about  trivia  questions  (or  other  questions  involving  epistemic 
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Fig. 4. From the trivia condition of Experiment 2, the percent of trials on which the 
critical item was predicted as a function of the overall strength of the critical item 
(weakest in Question Cluster A, strongest in Question Cluster E) and whether it was 
desirable (+$1), neutral ($0), or undesirable (-$1) for the critical items to be 
factually correct. 
questions  again  yielded  a  nonsignificant  effect,  F(2, 28) = 1.56, 
p > .20. Among the old questions, the overall rate at which the 
critical mark was predicted was 61.7%, 53.3%, and 52.8% in the 
+$1, $0, and $-1 conditions, respectively. We did not eliminate the 
most difficult question from our old set, so the modest (yet 
nonsignificant) effect in the old set is not surprising. Therefore, it 
is also not necessarily surprising nor problematic that the 
interaction between question type and desirability (+$1 or  -$1) 
was  not  significant, F(1, 29) = 1.34, p > .20. 
Fig. 5 depicts the results across both the new and old items, 
using the same grouping scheme as in Fig. 4. The 12 new questions 
tended to fall in the second and third groups of questions on the 
figure, which is precisely where there is a clear separation in the 
prediction rates for the +$1, $0, and -$1 conditions. 
Finally and not surprisingly, a repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed no evidence of a desirability bias on the subjective 
probability responses that were collected late in the experimental 
sessions, F(2, 28) = 0.13 p > .20. This was true even when the 
analysis was restricted to the new questions, F(2, 28) = 1.65 p > 
.20. Also, consistent with our intent of using difficult questions, 
participants tended to respond with ‘‘50%” for critical options on 
the new questions (specifically, 71% of the time). 
3 
Readers might wonder why prediction rates for the critical items on the new 
questions were below 50%. Although we counterbalanced whether a critical item 
served in the +$1, $0, or -$1 conditions, the determination of which answer/item for a 
question would be the critical rather than noncritical item was done randomly when 
designing the experiment and was the same for each participant. Therefore, the sub- 
50% prediction rates simply reflect the fact that the items randomly deemed to be 
critical were slightly less attractive as guesses than were the items deemed as 
noncritical. This is not a concern for any of our conclusions. 
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not expect to see a robust desirability bias when the dependent 
measure solicits likelihood judgments. When likelihood judgments 
are solicited (at least under typical conditions; see Experiment 5 
for an alternative), people would use the available evidence to 
generate their likelihood estimates, and there is no point at 
which it would seem suitable to insert an arbitrary component 
or guess. Therefore, there is no point at which to insert an 
arbitrary sense of optimism about an outcome. We should note 
that the biased- threshold account also does not predict a 
desirability bias for likelihood judgments, because there is not a 
role for a decision/prediction threshold in the judgment process. 
In Experiment 4, we used a slightly modified version of our 
marked-card paradigm (discussed in the next paragraph) and we 
randomly assigned participants to either provide predictions or 
likelihood judgments—corresponding to two conditions  we  will 
call dichotomous and continuous. Critically, we made these two 
conditions as similar as possible. In fact, the only difference was 
the 
Fig. 5.  From the new and old questions in Experiment 3, the percent of trials on 
which the critical item was predicted as a function of the overall strength of the 
critical item (weakest in Question Cluster A, strongest in Question Cluster E) and 
whether it was desirable (+$1), neutral ($0), or undesirable (-$1) for the critical 
items to be factually correct. 
Discussion 
These results show that predictions for trivia questions are not 
immune to the desirability bias. Consistent with our biased-
guessing account, when people see no imbalance in the evidence 
for two options, their predictions are guesses that are vulnerable to 
a desirability bias. 
Experiment 4 
Thus far, we have focused on people’s discrete outcome 
predictions. Yet, there are many everyday contexts in which 
people must estimate the likelihood of an event, not merely make 
a prediction. Although bias observed in outcome predictions is 
sometimes assumed to serve as evidence of bias in subjective 
likelihood, this has been identified as a questionable 
assumption (see discussion by Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; see 
also Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Therefore, testing the 
desirability bias with likelihood judgments is just as critical as 
testing the bias with discrete predictions. In Experiment 4, we 
returned to the card paradigm and directly compared the 
degree of the desirability bias in a likelihood-judgment condition 
and an outcome-prediction condition. 
This direct comparison is particularly useful given the mixed 
findings from studies that have examined the desirability bias in 
likelihood judgments about stochastic events. For example, Biner, 
Huffman, Curran, and Long (1998) used a food reward to make a 
specific outcome of a card drawing desirable, and they found a sig- 
nificant desirability effect on a confidence measure. However, Bar- 
Hillel and Budescu (1995) conducted four studies in which the sub- 
jective probability of a chance outcome (e.g., a random selection 
from a visually presented matrix) was not significantly impacted 
by the desirability of the outcome. Most relevant is Price and Mar- 
quez (2005), who found that neither confidence estimates nor sub- 
jective probabilities were influenced by outcome desirability in a 
paradigm that was essentially the classic marked-card paradigm. 
Our direct comparison between likelihood judgments and out- 
come predictions also provided another test of whether biased- 
evaluation, rather than biased-guessing or biased-thresholds, can 
account for the desirability bias in outcome predictions in the 
marked-card paradigm. If biased-evaluation processes are critical, 
then we should expect that the desirability bias would be compa- 
rable in magnitude when likelihood judgments or predictions are 
solicited. However, if biased guessing is critical, then we would 
wording and formatting of the response anchors and scale that 
appeared below the question: ‘‘What is your prediction about 
which card was drawn?” In the dichotomous condition, two 
labeled response buttons (e.g., ‘‘Z” and ‘‘Y”) appeared. In the 
continuous condition, a slider scale was used. More specifically, 
participants placed or slid a red marker along a line that had 
three anchors (e.g., ‘‘was definitely Z” on the left, ‘‘equal chances 
of Z and Y” in the middle, and ‘‘was definitely Y” on the right). 
Our key question of interest was whether the rather precise 
differences between our prediction and likelihood measures would 
result in different degrees of desirability bias. 
We also used Experiment 4 to check on a counter-explanation 
for why the desirability bias was robust in the card condition but 
not the trivia condition of Experiment 2. Within the trivia condi- 
tion of Experiment 2, but not in the card condition, the predictions 
were technically post-dictions, because the factual outcomes or 
answers to the trivia questions were already determined yet 
un- known to the participant. Previous research has detected 
betting and confidence differences between prediction and 
post-diction (Rothbart & Snyder, 1970). To test whether pre-
diction is a prerequisite for observing a desirability bias (and 
thereby assess whether the post-diction–prediction difference is 
a valid counter- explanation for the results of Experiment 2), 
we solicited only post-dictions. That is, participants in both 
the dichotomous and continuous conditions provided their 
responses after the experimenter had already drawn the card on 
a given round. We expected the usual desirability bias in the 
dichotomous condition, because the role of guessing should not 
depend on whether the outcome has yet to occur or has already 
occurred but is still unknown. 
Method 
Forty-six undergraduates were randomly assigned to either the 
dichotomous or continuous condition. The other factors, 
procedures, and materials were identical to those of Experiment 1 
with two exceptions. First, the experimenter always selected a 
card from the deck immediately before the participant was 
prompted to respond. Second, the scales in the two conditions 
differed as de- scribed previously (see two paragraphs above). 
For the accuracy incentive, all participants heard the same 
instructions ($0.25 per correct response). If asked for more 
information by a participant in the continuous condition, the 
experimenter explained that accuracy was based on whether their 
response was on the correct side of the scale. 
Results 
For the dichotomous condition, the results were similar to those 
from  Experiment  1—see  Fig.  6.  Most  importantly,  a  repeated 
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Fig. 6. From the dichotomous condition of Experiment 4, the percent of trials on 
which the critical card was postdicted as a function of the frequency of the critical 
card (out of 10) and whether the drawing of a critical card was desirable (+$1), 
neutral ($0), or undesirable (-$1). 
 
Fig. 8. From the continuous condition of Experiment 4, the percent of trials on 
which participants’ likelihood judgments favored the critical item over the 
noncritical item, as a function of the frequency of the critical card (out of 10) and 
whether the drawing of a critical card was desirable (+$1), neutral ($0), or 
undesirable  (-$1). 
 
measures   ANOVA   revealed   a   significant   desirability   effect, 
F(2, 20) = 12.85, p < .001. The overall rate at which the critical mark 
 
 
dependent-measure format (either dichotomous or continuous for- 
was predicted was 72.3%, 48.2%, and 37.7% in the +$1, $0, and -$1 
conditions, respectively. In short, even though a post-diction 
para- 
mat—with the data dichotomized) and value (+$1 or -$1) was sig
digm was used, the desirability bias was strong as usual. 
For the continuous condition, we coded responses from 0% (for 
a response located at the endpoint anchored by the noncritical 
item) to 100% (for a response located at the endpoint anchored 
by the critical item). Fig. 7 displays the data pattern. In terms of 
inferential analyses, the most important finding was that a 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a nonsignificant yet 
borderline desirability effect, F(2, 22) = 2.82, p = .08. The mean 
likelihood judgments regarding the critical options were 52.8%, 
50.2%, and 47.8% in the +$1, $0, and -$1 conditions, respectively. 
We also dichotomized the continuous data based on whether a 
participant’s response was or was not on the side of the critical op- 
tion (see Fig. 8). This allows us to directly compare results from the 
dichotomous and continuous conditions. There was a non-
significant desirability effect, F(2, 22) = 2.16, p = .14. The overall 
rate at which the critical mark was predicted was 54.2%, 
51.3%, and 46.3% in the +$1, $0, and -$1 conditions, respectively. 
More important, in a larger mixed-design ANOVA, the 
interaction between 
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Fig. 7. From the continuous condition of Experiment 4, average likelihood 
judgment for the critical card as a function of the frequency of the critical card 
(out of 10) and whether the drawing of a critical card was desirable (+$1), neutral 
($0), or undesirable (-$1). 
nificant,  F(2, 43) = 6.53,  p < .01.  This  finding  indicates  that  the 
desirability bias was significantly larger in the dichotomous 
condition than in the continuous condition. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 4 suggest that the desirability bias 
operates the same in a postdiction paradigm as in a prediction 
paradigm. The results also show that the magnitude of the 
desirability bias drops substantially when a continuous 
likelihood judgment rather than a dichotomous prediction  is  
solicited.  The findings are again consistent with the biased-
guessing account. This ac- count assumes that guessing would 
play the same role in dichotomous postdiction and prediction, 
but that guessing or arbitrary optimism would not have the 
same role in likelihood judgment. 
 
Experiment 5 
 
In Experiments 1–4, we did not directly manipulate rates of 
guessing. Instead, we tested whether the desirability bias would 
shrink substantially in conditions in which arbitrary guessing 
would not be critical determinants of responses (e.g., likelihood 
judgments; outcome predictions about nonstochastic events, ex- 
cept for incredibly difficult trivia questions). In Experiment 5, we 
sought more specific evidence of the role of guessing by directly 
manipulating guessing. We again used our marked-card paradigm, 
and we again used likelihood judgments as the dependent mea- 
sure. We reasoned that even though likelihood judgments were 
shown in Experiment 4 to be relatively insensitive to desirability 
biases, we would observe a stronger desirability bias if we could 
sufficiently encourage participants to inject their arbitrary hunches 
or guesses into their estimates. To do this, we used a scale-juxtapo- 
sition method that we have developed for other projects to encour- 
age people to separate their beliefs about the objective likelihood 
of an event from their more intuitive or gut-level impressions of 
the likelihood of the event. For each card draw, participants pro- 
vided two judgments on separate scales appearing on the same 
screen (see description below). This method, along with strong 
accompanying instructions, gave participants explicit encourage- 
ment to express their guesses on one scale but not the other. 
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Method 
 
Forty-four undergraduates participated. The design was 
identical to that of Experiment 1, except for the addition of a 
within-subject scale factor (assessment scale versus hunch 
scale). The procedures were also identical except for the 
differences describe here. Namely, on the computer screens that 
solicited responses, there were two questions and scales. The first 
question asked ‘‘What is your statistical assessment as to the 
card that will be drawn?” and was accompanied by a slider scale 
anchored by ‘‘will definitely be Z” on the left, ‘‘equal chances of Z 
and Y” in the middle, and ‘‘will definitely be Y” on the right. After 
the participant responded, the second question appeared below 
the first (with the first question and scale remaining visible.) It 
asked ‘‘What is your hunch or intuition as to the card that will 
be drawn?” and was accompanied by a slider scale anchored by 
‘‘strongly leaning to- ward Z” on the left, ‘‘not leaning toward Z 
or Y” in the middle, 
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and ‘‘strongly leaning toward Y” on the right. Instructions provided 
at the beginning of the session introduced the distinction between 
the two questions: ‘‘First, we will ask you to take a rational, 
statistical, and objective point of view and indicate your best 
assessment of the likelihood of one or another outcome. Next, we 
will ask you about your hunch, your guess, or your intuitive 
expectation about what will happen in the card draw. Maybe 
your intuitive expectations and hunches are similar to your more 
rational or statistical assessments, but they certainly don’t need 
to be. We are interested in both types of predictions.” Given that 
we were encouraging people to flip between statistical 
assessments and hunches, we re- moved the monetary 
incentives for accuracy. 
 
 
Results 
 
Responses on both scales were coded from 0% to 100%, as they 
were for the continuous condition of Experiment 4. Fig. 9a and 9b 
display the results. Our main prediction was that responses on the 
assessment scale would not exhibit a desirability bias, whereas re- 
sponses on the hunch scale would exhibit a significant desirability 
bias. As is evident from a visual inspection of Fig. 9a and 9b tested 
more precisely below—this is exactly what we found. 
The  overall  analysis  for  this  study  involved  a   Scale- 
Type x Desirability x Frequency ANOVA. The most critical result, 
which supports our main hypothesis, was a significant Scale- 
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Fig. 9a. From the assessment scale of Experiment 5, average likelihood judgment 
for the critical card as a function of the frequency of the critical card (out of 10) and 
whether the drawing of a critical card was desirable (+$1), neutral ($0), or 
undesirable (-$1). All three desirability lines are represented yet difficult to 
distinguish due to their proximity/overlap. 
Fig. 9b. From the hunch scale of Experiment 5, average likelihood judgment for the 
critical card as a function of the frequency of the critical card (out of 10) and 
whether the drawing of a critical card was desirable (+$1), neutral ($0), or 
undesirable  (-$1). 
 
 
Type x Desirability interaction, F(2, 42) = 15.50, p < .001. The 
Scale-Type factor also produced a significant main effect and an 
interaction with frequency (ps < .001), but rather than detailing 
all the results from the overall ANOVA, we will focus on analyses 
conducted within the levels of scale-type. 
For the assessment scale, the desirability main effect was, as 
expected, not significant, F(2, 42) = 1.18, p > .20. Not surprisingly, 
the frequency of the critical card was a strong influence on the 
estimates, F(4, 40) = 110.62, p < .001. Finally, the Desirability x 
Frequency effect was not significant, F(8, 36) = 0.87, p > .20. 
For the hunch scale, the desirability main effect was, as 
expected, significant, F(2, 42) = 15.82, p < .001. Not surprisingly, 
the frequency of the critical card was again a strong influence on 
the estimates, F(4, 40) = 24.65, p < .001. Finally, the Desirability x 
Frequency effect was not significant, F(8, 36) = 0.69, p > .20. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 5 demonstrate that when instructions 
and scales encourage people to express their hunch or guess—even 
on a continuous likelihood scale—the resulting estimates will be 
biased in an optimistic direction. This can be contrasted with the 
results of Experiment 4, which had demonstrated that when 
typical likelihood scales and instructions are used, people will 
not be substantially influenced by outcome desirability in the 
card paradigm. 
Of the experiments in this paper, Experiment 5 is most direct in 
providing support for the biased-guessing account. When guessing 
was not encouraged, the desirability bias was essentially absent; 
when guessing was encouraged, the desirability bias was robust. 
We should emphasize that nothing about the instructions for the 
hunch scale suggested to people that they should guess 
optimistically rather than pessimistically or neutrally. It was 
conceivable that the results for the hunch scale could have reflected 
an increase in pessimism (e.g., bracing for negative outcomes) 
or simply no desirability effect (e.g., if the hunches reflected 
essentially random fluctuations). Therefore, the fact that the 
findings from the hunch scale revealed a tendency for guesses to 
fall in an optimistic direction is instructive, and it is compatible 
with our position that optimistic guessing was the primary basis 
for the effects in earlier experiments. 
With that said, the results of Experiment 5 do have wrinkles. 
First, as is evident from Fig. 9b, the overall desirability bias is 
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primarily driven by differences between the +$1 condition and the 
other two conditions; likelihood judgments did not differ between 
the -$1 and $0 conditions (p > .20). Second, the magnitude of the 
desirability bias involving hunches in this study is clearly smaller 
than those observed when participants made outcome predictions 
about cards in our other experiments. Additional research would 
be necessary to test whether these features of the results persist 
in replications and to determine precisely why. However, we do 
not believe that these features disqualify the conclusion that the 
results of Experiment 5 are supportive of our biased-guessing ac- 
count. It is not too surprising that some characteristics of the 
desirability bias do not perfectly align between experiments 
that use substantially different dependent variables. Another 
interesting question for future research is whether the same 
desirability bias can be found when people see only one 
likelihood scale, but they are strongly urged to express their 
hunch. In designing Experiment 5, we assumed (based on 
preliminary work with juxtaposed scales in our lab) that the act of 
reporting their careful estimates of objective probability would 
help participants to distinguish between their objective 
assessments and their hunches—otherwise their re- ported hunch 
would be heavily anchored by what they knew to be the 
objectively correct answer. However, only additional research 
can determine whether it was the strong instructions or the 
combination of strong instructions and the juxtaposed-scales 
method- ology that were critical for eliciting a significant 
desirability bias in Experiment 5. 
 
 
General discussion 
 
In the introduction to this paper, we discussed how the existing 
evidence for the desirability bias was mixed, and that the strongest 
evidence for some form of desirability bias was localized within a 
particular paradigm—the marked-card paradigm. Therefore, in the 
research described here, we sought to gain a better understanding 
of what underlies the desirability bias in the marked-card 
paradigm as well as test whether the bias extends to situations 
slightly different from the marked-card paradigm—namely to 
cases in which an outcome is nonstochastic and cases in which a 
likelihood judgment is solicited. Our main hypothesis was that the 
desirability bias in the marked-card paradigm was due primarily 
to biased guessing rather than biased evidence evaluation or 
biased-thresh- olds (or to experimental artifacts). 
In Experiment 1, we detected the desirability bias in our new 
version of the marked-card paradigm that removed potential arti- 
factual problems. In Experiments 2 and 3, using essentially the 
same paradigm but with nonstochastic rather than stochastic 
events, we showed that the desirability bias did not have the same 
impact on predictions about trivia questions, except for questions 
that were exceedingly difficult. In Experiment 4, the desirability 
bias was shown to extend to a postdiction paradigm but not to 
cases in which likelihood judgments rather than dichotomous 
postdictions were solicited. Finally, using a novel juxtaposed-scale 
method in Experiment 5, we showed that even for continuous 
likelihood judgments, a robust desirability bias could be 
observed when guessing was encouraged on one of the scales. 
This set of findings is consistent with our position that biased 
guessing is the primary contributor to the robust effects in the 
classic marked-card paradigm. When participants in the marked-
card paradigm face a deck with an equal number of critical and 
noncritical cards, guessing is essentially required. Even when the 
deck has unequal numbers of critical and noncritical cards, 
guessing might still be viewed as necessary by  participants—
except  for  those who apply a maximization principle. 
Therefore, biased guessing can account for large desirability 
biases regarding 50–50 desks as well as the gradual reduction in 
the desirability bias as the propor- 
tion of critical and noncritical cards becomes more unequal 
(Experiment 1). Also, the guessing component is applicable to 
stochastic events regardless of whether the relevant case 
concerns postdiction or prediction (Experiment 4). For 
nonstochastic outcomes, however, guessing is usually less 
relevant (Experiment 2). Participants base their prediction (or 
postdiction) on whatever their assessment of the evidence 
suggests; they are naturally reluctant to make a prediction that 
contradicts their own evidence assessment. If their evidence 
assessment offers no distinction between two outcomes (as with 
the exceptionally difficult questions introduced in Experiment 3), 
entirely arbitrary guessing becomes relevant, which makes 
predictions vulnerable to a desirability bias. Finally, for making 
likelihood judgments under typical conditions or instructions 
(e.g., Experiment 4), entirely arbitrary guessing is not relevant 
and therefore the desirability bias is minimal. However, when 
instructions and the juxtaposed-question format encouraged 
guessing, the desirability bias was robust (Experiment 5). 
The biased-evaluation and biased-threshold accounts would 
have difficulty explaining elements of the overall result pattern. 
A biased-evaluation account would have particular difficulty 
explaining why the effects detected on outcome predictions would 
not extend to likelihood judgments. Assuming that evidence 
evaluation processes precede a response stage, one would expect 
any bias in evidence evaluation to manifest on various types 
of responses, not just outcome predictions. The biased-
threshold ac- count would have difficulty explaining why effects 
detected with stochastic cases (the card conditions) did not 
readily extend to the nonstochastic cases (the trivia conditions). 
If the desirability bias is simply due to a shift in response 
threshold, the bias would have been more evident for the most 
difficult trivia questions from Experiment 2, not merely the 
exceedingly difficult questions that we inserted in Experiment 3 
as a way of testing guessing. 
We should note that a biased-threshold account could be 
modified or extended in an effort to account for the results of 
Experiments 1–4. However, such an account would have to 
include awkward caveats. For example, we could assume that 
the bias in thresholds is so small that it produces detectable 
desirability bias only when uncertainty is exceedingly high (to 
account for the tri- via-condition results), but less uncertainty 
might be required when there is stochasticity in the outcomes (to 
explain why there is a desirability bias even for 60–40 card 
decks, not just 50–50 decks). Furthermore, any biased-threshold 
account would have difficulty with the results of Experiment 5, 
because decision thresholds are not applicable to judgments on a 
continuous scale. Therefore, we favor our biased-guessing 
account and believe it is importantly distinct from a biased-
threshold account. To explain the results of Experiment 5 
using our biased-guessing account, we need to assume that a 
subjectively arbitrary component of an expectation can be 
expressed within a discrete prediction (as in the classic effect) 
but can also be exhibited as a judgment bias under some unique 
conditions (such as those set up in Experiment 5). 
 
 
The big picture on the desirability bias 
 
As we have discussed, our findings make a strong case that 
biased guessing is a key reason for the classic desirability biases 
found in the marked-card paradigm. However, what does the set 
of findings suggest about the desirability bias outside the specific 
paradigm? First, in terms of generalizing the marked-card results 
to everyday contexts, our findings suggest that people will often 
make optimistic predictions when guessing about stochastic out- 
comes. This is a critical conclusion because many everyday con- 
texts involve predictions about outcomes that are either fully or 
partially  stochastic,  such  as  the  case  with  Bob  in  the  opening 
 
 
vignette, who might attempt to predict if the weather will allow 
the Blue Angles to fly. 
Second, however, there are also many everyday contexts in 
which people need to make predictions about outcomes for which 
the relevant uncertainty is epistemic, not stochastic, such as Julie 
attempting to determine whether her branch is the one being 
closed (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Our findings suggest that 
desirability biases might be less strong or absent in such cases, un- 
less a person is so uncertain that she must simply guess about the 
outcome, rather than let her  perceptions of evidence guide her 
predictions. 
Third, our findings have important implications for the question 
of how outcome desirability impacts (if at all) judgments of 
likelihood or scaled optimism. The body of published research on 
this question is far from convincing (see Krizan & Windschitl, 
2007a, 2009). Experiments directly examining this issue have 
produced mixed results (e.g., Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Bar-
Hillel et al., 2008a, 2008b; Klein, 1999, Study 1; Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007b; Price, 2000; Vosgerau, submitted for 
publication). In perhaps a telling sign regarding the published 
research on this issue, Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1995) entitled 
their paper describing several tests of the desirability bias (or 
wishful thinking) as ‘‘The Elusive Wish- ful Thinking Effect,” and 
they entitled a recent follow-up chapter as ‘‘Wishful Thinking in 
Predicting World Cup Results: Still Elusive” (Bar-Hillel et al., 
2008b). Also, although there are many plausible mechanisms by 
which motivations might influence evidence eval- uation (see e.g., 
Armor & Taylor, 1998; Croyle, Sun, & Hart, 1997; Ditto & Lopez, 
1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007a; Kunda, 
1990), these mechanisms have not been adequately tested in 
studies in which the dependent variable is likelihood judgment. 
When some form of likelihood judgment is the depen- dent 
variable, there can be  factors that enhance pessimism (or 
mitigate optimism), most notably a tendency to brace for bad news 
(Butler & Mathews, 1987; Sanna, 1999; Shepperd, Findley-Klein, 
Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000; Shepperd, Grace, Cole, & Klein, 
2005; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Sweeny, Carroll, & 
Shepperd, 2006; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, 
& van der Pligt, 2003; see also Armor & Sackett, 2006; Gilovich, 
Kerr, & Medvec, 1993). Finally, various studies and conceptual per- 
spectives suggest ways in which people are pessimistically biased 
(e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1985; Mandel, 2008; Pratto & John, 1991; 
Risen & Gilovich, 2007; Risen & Gilovich, 2008; Weber, 1994; We- 
ber & Hilton, 1990; see also Chambers & Windschitl, 2004). In 
short, the question of how desires influence scaled optimism is 
far from settled in the existing literature. 
Our findings suggest that the influence of outcome desirability 
must be understood in two parts. First, people—on average—might 
exhibit no large-scale optimistic or pessimistic biases in how they 
evaluate the likelihood of a desired outcome, when those 
likelihood estimates are solicited in a typical way (such as in 
Experiment 4). Second, people might simultaneously hold an 
optimistic assumption about potential outcomes, but this 
optimism will only be apparent with some types of measures 
(e.g., outcome predictions, specific likelihood measures that 
encourage and  facilitate the expression of hunches). Returning 
to the title of this paper, people may sometimes have a way of 
‘‘going optimistic without leaving realism.” 
 
Coda 
 
Despite our conclusion about ‘‘going optimistic without leaving 
realism,” we would be remiss if we did not point out the perhaps 
larger lesson from our results. Namely, any discussion of 
desirability bias must attend to potential moderators. As 
illustrated by our own findings, the apparent magnitude of a 
desirability bias can shift dramatically as a function of the 
nature of the critical out- 
come and the type of dependent variable—even when the same 
amounts of money are used to manipulate desire in these cases. 
Another potential moderator or set of moderators would be 
individual differences. Although not discussed above, we 
included many individual-difference measures in these studies. 
As it turns out, none were particularly useful for determining 
who would show an optimistic versus pessimistic tendency (see 
description in Appendix A). Perhaps there is, in fact, a broad-
based tendency for humans to lean—all else equal—in an 
optimistic direction (see Armor and Taylor; 1998; Lench & 
Ditto, 2008; Peterson, 2000; Schneider, 2001; Taylor & Brown, 
1988). People might typically de- fault to an optimistic orientation 
given that optimism seems to be required for the fulfillment of 
goals (Armor & Taylor, 1998), or be- cause an optimistic 
orientation is more compatible with maintain- ing a positive 
mood (Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998) and with 
being favorably perceived by others (Helweg-Larsen, 
Sadeghian, & Webb, 2002). However, we believe moderators of 
these influences could be quite important. For example, testing 
within a different culture or making a prevention goal (rather than 
promotion goal) salient could impact the results. Therefore, ‘‘going 
optimistic without leaving realism” provides a good description of 
what was found within the parameters of our experiments, and it 
may well reflect a general tendency, but we believe there is much 
to be learned about what moderators substantially qualify that 
phrase. 
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Appendix A 
 
Although we  analyzed for individual-differences correlates 
within each experiment, the power to detect such correlates within 
many of our studies was small. Therefore, we also analyzed 
correlations across some experiments, and below we report the 
results in three sets: (1) based on participants who made outcome 
predictions about cards (Experiments 1, 2, and 4; total N = 52), (2) 
based on participants from the trivia conditions, who always 
made out- come predictions (Experiments 2 and 3; total N = 69), 
and (3) based on participants responses to the hunch scale from 
Experiment 5 (N = 44). Our main interest for these analyses was 
how the magnitude of the desirability bias—indexed as the 
difference between the rates of selecting the critical item when it 
was positive (+$1) versus when it was negative (-$1)—was related 
to the scores on the standard individual-difference measures. 
The measures that we used included the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), 
the Rational-Experiential Inventory, which assesses interest and 
self- perceived ability in relying on rational or experiential 
thinking (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), the Numeracy Scale 
(Lipkus, Samsa, 
& Rimer, 2001), and the Life Orientation Test, which assesses dis- 
positional optimism (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). 
Experiments 1–4 also included a measure of promotion and 
prevention motivational orientations (RFQ; Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire; Higgins et al., 2001), whereas Experiment 5 
included the Behavior Inhibition Scale and Activation Scale 
(BIS/BAS; Car- ver & White, 1994) and the Belief in Good Luck 
Scale (Darke & Freedman, 1997). 
In selecting these measures, we only included measures for 
which we could—a priori—articulate at least some rationale for 
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Critical predictions in percentage for card paradigm in Experiment 1 (see Fig. 2) 
Critical predictions in percentage for card condition of Experiment 2 (see Fig. 3) 
Critical predictions in percentage for trivia condition of Experiment 2 (see Fig. 4) 
Critical predictions in percentage for trivia condition of Experiment 3 (see Fig. 5) 
Critical predictions in percentage for the dichotomous condition of Experiment 4 (see Fig. 6) 
Likelihood judgments for the continuous condition of Experiment 4 (see Fig. 7) 
Percent of predictions favoring critical option for continuous condition of Experiment 4 (see Fig. 8) 
Likelihood judgments for the assessment scale of Experiment 5 (see Fig. 9a) 
 
Table A1 
Correlations between desirability bias and various individual-difference measures. 
 
 Card conditions of 
Experiments 1, 2, and 4 
Trivia conditions of 
Experiments 2 and 3 
Hunch scale condition 
of Experiment 5 
Dispositional optimism (from LOT-R) .14 .12 -.06 
Positive affect (from PANAS) .13 .18 .08 
Negative affect (from PANAS) .10 -.05 -.12 
Numeracy -.29
*
 -.19 -.15 
Need for cognition -.20 .10 .03 
Rational thinking total (from REI) -.15 .05 .09 
Experiential thinking total (from REI) .26 .11 .25 
Promotion focus (from RFQ) .03 .04  
Prevention focus (from RFQ) .14 .00  
Behavioral inhibition scale 
BAS—drive 
  -.31
*
 
-.16 
BAS—fun seeking   .15 
BAS—reward responsiveness   .05 
Belief in good luck scale   .24 
*   
Significant at .05 level. 
 
its potential as a moderator of desirability bias. Nonetheless, 
essentially none of the measures proved to be a substantial 
moderator of the desirability bias (see Table A1). We will leave it to 
the reader to interpret patterns of interest, but our overall 
conclusion was that the standard measures were not helpful in 
predicting the magnitude (or direction) of people’s desirability 
biases. Some readers might be most surprised by the fact that 
dispositional optimism measured with the LOT-R did not 
significantly predict the desirability bias, but other researchers 
have already documented that the LOT-R often does not do well in 
predicting optimism about specific events (e.g., Lipkus, Martz, Panter, 
Drigotas, & Feaganes, 1993). 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
See Table B1. 
 
Table B1 
This table displays the exact means and standard deviations relevant to Figs. 2–9. 
 
 
 
Desirable (+$1) 13.3 29.7 46.7 44.2 90.0 20.7 93.3 17.6 100.0 0.0 
Neutral ($0) 0.0 0.0 3.3 12.9 60.0 38.7 90.0 20.7 96.7 12.9 
Undesirable (-$1) 0.0 0.0 16.7 30.9 23.3 32.0 70.0 41.4 80.0 36.8 
 
Desirable (+$1) 6.7 17.6 53.3 39.9 80.0 31.6 93.3 25.8 100.0 0.0 
Neutral ($0) 6.7 17.6 30.0 45.5 53.3 35.2 83.3 24.4 96.7 12.9 
Undesirable (-$1) 6.7 17.6 30.0 41.4 30.0 36.8 53.3 44.2 83.3 30.9 
 
Desirable (+$1) 34.6 45.1 52.6 48.4 51.3 50.8 66.7 47.9 84.6 32.5 
Neutral ($0) 30.8 40.4 55.1 50.6 47.4 50.3 57.7 49.7 79.5 35.7 
Undesirable (-$1) 20.5 30.9 46.2 51.0 50.0 50.1 60.3 48.0 84.6 32.8 
 
Desirable (+$1) 31.7 48.4 50.0 50.4 63.3 49.4 60.0 48.9 76.7 40.2 
Neutral ($0) 25.0 45.2 33.3 46.9 48.3 51.1 53.3 52.0 85.0 32.6 
Undesirable (-$1) 26.7 45.3 28.3 45.2 31.7 47.9 56.7 45.1 76.7 43.0 
 
Desirable (+$1) 29.5 36.7 54.5 43.4 77.3 36.9 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
Neutral ($0) 4.5 14.7 9.1 19.7 43.2 38.7 84.1 23.8 100.0 0.0 
Undesirable (-$1) 4.5 14.7 15.9 28.4 36.4 44.1 54.5 40.6 77.3 36.9 
 
Desirable (+$1) 21.0 12.5 43.3 15.5 51.1 6.3 67.5 11.1 81.0 13.5 
Neutral ($0) 17.8 9.0 34.5 11.0 50.4 6.9 67.4 11.0 81.0 8.5 
Undesirable (-$1) 16.6 8.2 35.8 13.4 47.4 10.1 60.7 18.0 78.6 13.2 
 
Desirable (+$1) 2.1 10.2 20.8 35.9 58.3 35.1 93.8 16.9 95.8 14.1 
Neutral ($0) 2.1 10.2 4.2 14.1 58.3 38.1 93.8 16.9 97.9 10.2 
Undesirable (-$1) 0.0 0.0 10.4 25.4 37.5 36.9 87.5 30.4 95.8 20.4 
 
Desirable (+$1) 21.0 12.2 33.2 10.2 50.0 0.7 68.5 10.0 80.0 11.58 
Neutral ($0) 20.6 11.3 33.5 10.2 49.9 0.3 66.9 8.5 80.2 9.8 
Undesirable (-$1) 18.2 10.5 33.5 9.7 50.0 0.2 67.7 11.3 79.3 11.4 
Likelihood judgments for the hunch scale of Experiment 5 (see Fig. 9b) 
Desirable (+$1) 39.4 18.0 50.5 12.2 61.0 15.2 61.7 14.7 74.0 15.5 
Neutral ($0) 32.7 16.1 46.2 15.7 51.4 15.1 56.1 15.7 65.2 20.1 
Undesirable (-$1) 30.5 17.0 42.4 19.5 52.5 17.6 52.6 16.7 67.3 17.4 
Note: percentages were first calculated per participant, and then the mean (or overall) percentages and the standard deviations were computed across participants. 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
Five examples of the trivia questions used in Study 2. 
 
(1) How much of the world’s population is left-handed?—About 
25%, About 10%. 
(2) Which state accounts for more oil produced in the United 
States?—Alaska, Texas. 
(3) What country sends the most tourists to Australia?—Japan,  
United States. 
(4) What is the most common last name in the US?—Smith,  
Johnson. 
(5) Which state was first to require license plates on cars?—New 
York, Massachusetts. 
 
Five examples of the new and exceedingly difficult trivia 
questions used in Study 3. 
 
(1) The first police force was established in Paris in what year? 
—1676, 1667. 
(2) What is the genus of both golden peas and night monkeys? 
—Aotus, Oenanthe. 
(3) In   2000,   how   many   people   visited   the   Eiffel   Tower? 
—6,315,324, 6,423,658. 
(4) Who was the first US president inaugurated in American- 
made clothes?—James Madison, Andrew Jackson. 
(5) Who  invented  the  lava  lamp?—Andrew  Jenkins,  Edward  
Walker. 
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